Lesson 4 of 6 · Challenger and columbia
Connect Shuttle hardware failures with decision processes
8 minute lesson · 3 checks along the way
Your goal for this lessonCompare Challenger and Columbia without treating prior success as proof of safety.
In this lesson 3 sections · 3 checks
Using archive links & definitions
Words with a dotted underline open a short definition right here in the lesson.
Read & understand
Challenger revealed a joint and a decision failure
Challenger and its seven crew members were lost on January 28, 1986. The Rogers Commission identified failure of the right solid rocket booster field joint’s sealing system, allowing hot gases to escape. Cold conditions and the joint’s design and behavior were central to the technical account.
The commission also examined how information and concerns were handled before launch. Its findings included communication failures and a flawed decision process. A summary limited to “an O-ring broke” omits why the known concerns did not produce an adequate barrier to launching.
Check 1 of 3
10 pointsUse the reading above. You can try again without losing points.
Read & understand
Columbia linked launch damage to reentry loss
Columbia and its seven crew members were lost during reentry on February 1, 2003. Foam shed from the external tank during launch had struck and breached the left wing’s thermal protection. Hot entry gases then entered the damaged structure. The damaging event and the final loss occurred at different phases of the mission.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board also addressed organizational conditions, assessment of foam risk and the handling of concerns and requests for additional information. Previous flights with foam shedding did not establish that another strike would be harmless. Surviving an earlier departure from expectations is not the same as proving the condition acceptable.
Connect the physical and organizational accounts
Original teaching diagram. Physical chain. Joint leakage or thermal breach. Conditions and mission phases. Decision chain. Evidence and unresolved concerns. Authority, review and follow-up. Past survival does not establish acceptable performance outside the supported operating evidence.
Open full-size diagram in a new tab: Connect the physical and organizational accountsCheck 2 of 3
10 pointsUse the reading above. You can try again without losing points.
Read & understand
Examine how evidence reaches authority
For a fictional launch review, engineers report that a seal has not been tested in forecast conditions. The question is not simply whether anyone can prove a disaster will happen. Decision-makers need evidence that the required performance is supported, and unresolved uncertainty must be communicated accurately.
can involve hardware redesign, testing, independent review and changes in authority or communication. None is validated solely by being written into a policy. Compare implementation and later practice with the investigation’s findings, while keeping the lost crews and their work visible rather than turning these events into trivia.
Check 3 of 3
10 pointsUse the reading above. You can try again without losing points.
Put it together
Your lesson progress
Each check connects to a part of the story. Complete all 3 to earn your 25-point lesson bonus.
Explore further · Optional
Go to the source
Explore the evidence behind this lesson. These optional readings and videos open in a new tab.
- Read: Presidential Commission: Challenger reportCompare the explanation and its assumptions with the worked example in this lesson.
- Read: NASA Safety and Mission Assurance: ChallengerCompare the explanation and its assumptions with the worked example in this lesson.
- Read: Columbia Accident Investigation Board: volume ICompare the explanation and its assumptions with the worked example in this lesson.
- Read: NASA Safety and Mission Assurance: ColumbiaCompare the explanation and its assumptions with the worked example in this lesson.